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We generalize the Antras and Helpman (2004) model of the international organization of production
in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree
of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of firms with heterogeneous productivities
decide whether to integrate or outsource the production of intermediate inputs, and from which country
to source them. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationship-specific investments which
are only partially contractible, both in an integrated firm and in an arm's-length relationship. We describe
equilibria in which firms with different productivity levels choose different ownership structures and
supplier locations, and then study the effects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on
the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. Better contracting institutions in the South raise
the prevalence of offshoring, but may reduce the relative prevalence of FDI or foreign outsourcing.
The impact on the composition of offshoring depends on whether the institutional improvement affects
disproportionately the contractibility of a particular input. A key message of the paper is that improvements
in the contractibility of inputs controlled by final-good producers have different effects than improvements














ehelpman@harvard.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Insights from neoclassical trade theory and new trade theory have improved our understanding of
the structure of foreign trade and investment. Recent developments in the world economy have
sparked, however, an increased interest in new theoretical approaches designed to better understand
the evidence about ﬁrms that organize production on a global scale. These developments include
the growing role of multinational corporations in the global economy,1 their engagement in more
complex integration strategies,2 and the growing share of intermediate inputs in trade ﬂows.3
Although traditional theories allow for trade in intermediate inputs and for the emergence
of international production networks,4 they cannot explain some newly observed phenomena.5
First, while the traditional approaches assume that ﬁrms are (for the most part) symmetrically
structured within industries, the data exhibit substantial within-industry heterogeneity, both in
the size distribution of ﬁrms and in their participation in foreign trade.6 Second, in developing
global sourcing strategies ﬁrms decide on where to locate the production of diﬀerent parts of their
value chains and also on the extent of their control over these activities. Which activities should they
locate in the home country and which should they oﬀshore? If they choose to oﬀshore, should they
engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) and import intermediate inputs within their boundaries
or should they outsource the production of intermediates to independent foreign suppliers? As
is well known from the work of Coase (1937), Williamson (1975, 1985), and Grossman and Hart
(1986), these questions cannot be answered in a complete-contracting framework of the type used
in traditional theories of international trade.
In Antràs and Helpman (2004) we developed a simple two-country Ricardian model of inter-
national trade in order to address some of these issues. In our model, ﬁr m si nt h eN o r t hd e v e l o p
diﬀerentiated products. Then they decide whether to integrate the production of intermediates or
outsource them. In either case ﬁrms have to decide in which country to source these inputs, in the
high-cost North or the low-cost South. Production entails relationship-speciﬁc investments by both
the ﬁnal-good producers (or product developers) and their suppliers, and we assumed that the na-
ture of these investments does not enable the parties to specify them in an enforceable contract. As
in the work of Grossman and Hart (1986), we envisioned a world in which incomplete contracting
creates ineﬃciencies even when the production of intermediate inputs is carried out by integrated
suppliers. The key diﬀerence between integration and outsourcing is that only the former gives the
ﬁnal-good producer property rights over the fruits of the relationship-speciﬁc investments.
1The gross product (value-added) of multinational ﬁrms is roughly 25 percent of world GDP (UNCTAD, 2000).
Leaving out the value-added generated by parent ﬁrms, about 10 percent of world GDP is accounted for by foreign
aﬃliates, and this ratio has been increasing over time.
2See UNCTAD (1998) and Feinberg and Keane (2003).
3See for instance Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yeats (2001). Feenstra and Hanson (1996) estimate that the
share of imported intermediates increased from 5.3% of total U.S. intermediate purchases in 1972 to 11.6% in 1990.
Campa and Goldberg (1997) ﬁnd similar evidence for Canada and the U.K., but not for Japan.
4See Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chapters 11-13) and Jones (2000).
5See Helpman (2006) for a review of the newly observed phenomena and theoretical attempts to explain them.
6See Bernard and Jensen (1999) or Bernard et al. (2003) for evidence on heterogeneity in the exporting decision,
and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005) for evidence on heterogeneity in the importing decision.
1Our model focused on the choices between integration and outsourcing and between domes-
tic sourcing and foreign sourcing. In particular, we described an equilibrium in which ﬁrms with
diﬀerent productivity levels choose among the four feasible organizational modes: domestic out-
sourcing, domestic integration, foreign outsourcing (and thus imports of intermediate inputs at
arm’s length), and foreign integration (and thus FDI and intraﬁrm imports of inputs). We then
studied the eﬀects of variations in country and industry characteristics on the relative prevalence
of these organizational forms.
In this paper we generalize the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model to accommodate varying
degrees of contractual frictions.7 In particular, we adopt the formulation of partial contracting
from Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006). Final-good producers and their suppliers undertake
a continuum of relationship-speciﬁc activities aimed at producing an intermediate input used in
the production of the ﬁnal good. A fraction of these activities is ex-ante contractible while the rest
cannot be veriﬁed by a court of law and therefore are noncontractible. Both parties are bound to
perform their duties in the contractible activities, but they are free to choose how much they invest
in the noncontractible activities. Moreover, a party can withhold its noncontractible services at the
bargaining stage over the division of surplus if it is not satisﬁed with the outcome. Every party’s
expected payoﬀ in the bargaining game determines its willingness to invest in the noncontractible
activities. Suppliers of intermediate inputs do not expect to receive the full marginal return from
their investment in noncontractible activities, and therefore tend to underinvest in these activities
relative to a complete-contracting benchmark. The larger the fraction of noncontractible activities
is, the larger the distortions in production are.
We allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries.8 As in Antràs and
Helpman (2004), we describe equilibria in which ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels choose
diﬀerent ownership structures and supplier locations. We then study the eﬀects of changes in the
quality of contracting institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms.
We begin the analysis with a closed economy in which an organizational choice boils down to
outsourcing versus integration. We show that, as in our previous work, the relative importance of
the inputs provided by diﬀerent parties is a crucial determinant of the “make-or-buy” decision.9 In
particular, regardless of the degree of contractibility of the inputs, integration is proﬁt-maximizing
if and only if the production process is suﬃciently intensive in the input provided by the ﬁnal-good
producer. The new interesting result is that the degree of contractibility of diﬀerent inputs plays
a central role in the integration decision. Improvements in the contractibility of an input provided
by the ﬁnal-good producer encourage outsourcing while improvements in the contractibility of
7Using data on the activities of U.S. multinational ﬁrms, Yeaple (2006) presents evidence supporting some salient
cross-industry implications of our model. In particular, he ﬁnds that the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S.
imports (a measure of the relative prevalence of FDI over foreign outsourcing) is higher in industries with high R&D
intensity and high productivity dispersion. Although the generalized model developed in this paper also implies
a positive correlation between the share of intraﬁrm trade and productivity dispersion, it implies a more nuanced
correlation with R&D intensity.
8But we maintain the standard assumption that the set of available contracts does not vary with ﬁrm boundaries.
9See also Grossman and Hart (1986) and Antràs (2003, 2005).
2an input provided by a supplier encourage integration. This contrasts with the transaction-costs
literature (e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1985), where any type of contractual improvement tends to favor
outsourcing.
We next extend the analysis to a two-country world in which ﬁnal-good producers can contract
with suppliers in their home country, North, or a foreign country, South. Wages are higher in
North, but North has better contracting institutions in the sense that larger fractions of activities
are contractible in North. Although ﬁnal-good producers always locate in North and make their
investments there, we allow the contractibility of these investments to be a function of the location
of suppliers. This reﬂects the notion that certain clauses of a contract may be harder to enforce
when the contract governs an international transaction or when one of the parties resides in a
country with weaker contracting institutions.
Having constructed equilibria in which ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels sort into diﬀerent
organizational forms, we proceed to study the eﬀects of improvements in contractibility on the
relative prevalence of these organizational forms. We ﬁrst derive the result that improvements in
contractibility in South raise the share of Northern ﬁrms that oﬀshore the production of intermediate
inputs. In contrast, improvements in contractibility in North reduce the share of oﬀshoring ﬁrms.
These results are in line with recent arguments that the quality of contracting institutions impacts
comparative advantage (see Helpman (2006) for a summary); the work of Nunn (2006) provides
empirical support.10
We also show, however, that the eﬀect that changes in contractibility have on the relative
prevalence of particular organizational forms depends importantly on the nature of the contrac-
tual improvements. In particular, better contracting in South, which raises oﬀshoring, may reduce
the relative prevalence of FDI if the institutional improvement aﬀects disproportionately the con-
tractibility of inputs provided by the ﬁnal-good producer. And better contractibility in South may
reduce the share of ﬁrms engaged in oﬀshore outsourcing when the contractual improvements are
biased toward inputs provided by suppliers rather than the ﬁnal-good producer. One has to be
mindful of the impact that improvements in legal systems have on the contractibility of speciﬁc
inputs when predicting the prevalence of particular organizational forms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our model of the ﬁrm in the
presence of partial contracting. Section 3 studies the make-or-buy decision in a closed economy.
Section 4 extends the analysis to a two-country world. Section 5 concludes.
2 Technology and Investment
In this section we generalize the model of the ﬁrm that we developed in Antràs and Helpman (2004)
in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. For this purpose we ﬁrst focus
on a single ﬁrm that produces a brand of a diﬀerentiated product, for which it faces a demand
10Nunn’s (2006) estimates suggest that the impact of cross-country variation in contracting institutions on trade
ﬂows is of the same order of magnitude as the impact of cross-country variation in human capital.
3function
q = Ap−1/(1−α), 0 <α<1,
where q is quantity, p is price, A measures the demand level, and α is a parameter that controls
the demand elasticity; the larger α is the larger the elasticity of demand 1/(1 − α) i s .A si sw e l l
known, this form of demand results from constant elasticity-of-substitution preferences for brands
of a diﬀerentiated product. This demand function yields revenue
R = A1−αqα. (1)
Output q is produced with two inputs, headquarter services Xh and an intermediate input Xm,









, 0 <η h < 1,η m =1− ηh,
where θ represents productivity, which may vary across ﬁrms, and ηh is a parameter that measures
the technology’s headquarter intensity. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), both inputs are brand-
speciﬁc. That is, Xh and Xm have to be designed to precisely ﬁt the needs of this brand; otherwise
the services derived from the inputs equal zero. Moreover, an input designed to ﬁt this brand
cannot be usefully employed in the production of other brands of the product.
We follow Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006) in assuming that each one of the specialized
inputs is produced with a set of activities indexed by points on the interval [0,1], according to the
Cobb-Douglas production function






where xj (i) is the investment in activity i for input j. Investment in activities is input-speciﬁc:
they can be used only to produce the input for which they were designed. We assume that activities




, 0 ≤ µj ≤ 1, j = h,m, are contractible, in the sense
that the characteristics of these activities can be fully speciﬁed in advance in an enforceable ex-ante
contract. The remaining activities (µj,1] are not contractible.
The ﬁnal-good producer has to supply headquarter services and she has to hire a supplier for
the intermediate input. The supplier of Xm can be the ﬁrm’s employee or an outside agent. At this
point we put aside the question of whether the ﬁrm integrates the production of the intermediate
input or outsources it; we will deal with this question later. For now note that in either case
t h e r ei sa na g e n c yp r o b l e m ,b e c a u s eby assumption the ﬁrm needs a supplier. The organizational
form determines (i) ﬁxed costs, to be speciﬁed later; (ii) variable costs of investment cj per unit
xj (i) for j = h,m and i ∈ [0,1],w h e r ech is borne by the ﬁnal-good producer while cm is borne
by the supplier; (iii) the fractions of contractible activities µj, j = h,m; and (iv) the fraction
βh ∈ (0,1) of the revenue that the ﬁnal-good producer obtains at the bargaining stage, and the
4fraction βm =1−βh of the revenue that the supplier of Xm obtains. We will discuss the details of
alternative organizational forms in due course.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The ﬁnal-good producer enters the industry and ﬁnds out her productivity level θ.
2. The ﬁnal-good producer chooses to leave the industry or stay and produce.
3. If she chooses to stay, the ﬁnal-good producer chooses an organizational form.
4. The ﬁnal-good producer commits to invest {xhc (i)}
µh
i=0 in the contractible activities of head-
quarter services and she oﬀers potential suppliers a contract, which stipulates the supplier’s
required investment in the contractible activities of the intermediate input {xmc (i)}
µm
i=0 and
an upfront payment of τm to the supplier, which can be positive or negative.
5. A large pool of potential suppliers can earn income wm, a n dt h e ya r ew i l l i n gt oa c c e p tt h e
ﬁrm’s contract if the payoﬀ from supplying Xm is at least as large as wm.T h i sp a y o ﬀ consists
of the upfront payment τm plus the fraction βm of the revenue that they expect to receive at
the bargaining stage, minus the cost of the inputs {xm (i)}
1
i=0. Potential suppliers apply for
the ﬁrm’s contract and the ﬁrm chooses one supplier.
6. The supplier and the ﬁnal-good producer simultaneously choose their investment levels xj (i)=




, j = h,m, as speciﬁed in the contract, and both
























is sold and the resulting revenue is distributed between the ﬁnal-good producer and the
supplier in proportions βh and βm, respectively. (We will discuss the details of the bargaining
later on.)
We seek to characterize a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of this 7-stage game.
To characterize an SSPE of this game ﬁrst consider stage 6, in which the ﬁnal-good producer
and the supplier each choose their investment levels in the noncontractible activities. Using the








5subject to equation (2), xj (i)=xjc(i) for the contractible activities, and given investment levels








subject to equation (2), xj (i)=xjc(i) for the contractible activities, and given investment levels







αR, for i ∈ (µj,1],j= h,m, (3)

























, for i ∈ (µj,1],j , k = h,m, k 6= j,
where ω  = η  (1 − µ ) for   = h,m, and ω =
P
 =h,m ω .N o t et h a tωh measures the importance
of the noncontractible activities of headquarter services in the production of the ﬁnal good; it
represents the elasticity of output with respect to xhn. Similarly, ωm measures the importance of the
noncontractible activities of the intermediate input in the production of the ﬁnal good; it represents
the elasticity of output with respect to xmn. These measures of the impact of the noncontractible
activities on the production of the ﬁnal good play an important role in our applications of the model.
From the deﬁnition of ω , noncontractible activities of input   are more important the larger the
weight η  of input   is in the production function and the smaller the fraction of contractible
activities µ  is. That is, ω  results from an interaction of technological features with contracting
frictions.
For stage 5 of the game to generate a non-empty set of applicants for the supply of Xm the





xm (i)di + τm ≥ wm, (5)
where the left-hand side represents a supplier’s payoﬀ from forming a relationship with the ﬁnal-
good producer and the right-hand side represents his outside option before he forms this relation-
ship. In this participation constraint the investment levels in the noncontractible activities satisfy




, j = h,m,
as speciﬁed in the contract; and revenue R and output q are given by (1) and (2), respectively.




xh (i)di − τm,
6subject to (1), (2), the participation constraint (5), and the incentive compatibility constraints (4).
As long as there are no constraints on the upfront payment τm, the participation constraint is
satisﬁed with equality at the solution to this problem. Therefore we can solve the upfront payment
τm from the participation constraint treated as an equality and substitute the result into the ﬁnal-
good producer’s objective function. Under these circumstances the ﬁnal-good producer’s choice of





π ≡ R − ch
Z 1
0
xh (i)di − cm
Z 1
0
xm (i)di − wm,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (4) and the revenue and output equations (1) and









, j = h,m.U s i n g t h e ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problem together















Comparing this equation with (3) we obtain:11
Lemma 1 For every input j = h,m, investment in contractible activities is larger than investment
in noncontractible activities, i.e., xjc >x jn, for j = h,m.
Evidently, when investment in contractible activities exceeds investment in noncontractible
activities the investment levels do not maximize overall proﬁts, because the two types of investment
are equally costly. Moreover, the relative investment levels in the contractible activities, xhc/xmc =
(ηh/ch)/(ηm/cm),a r ep r o ﬁt maximizing, while the relative investment levels in the noncontractible
activities, xhn/xmn =( βh/βm)(ηh/ch)/(ηm/cm), are not. The latter results from the fact that
each party’s return on its investment in noncontractible activities depends on its bargaining share
βj, and these shares are not necessarily equal. If they are equal, there is no distortion in the
relative investment in noncontractible activities. Finally, note that the optimal investment levels




αR for j = h,m. Therefore in the equilibrium the
noncontractible activities are underinvested and the contractible activities are overinvested relative
to the revenue level R.



































11For a derivation of the proﬁt function and proof of Lemma 1, see the Appendix.
7This implies that the ﬁnal-good producer’s proﬁts are
π = ZΘ − wm, (8)
where Θ = θα/(1−α) is an alternative measure of productivity, and

























is a derived parameter which is proportional to the demand level; it depends on the costs of inputs,
on the bargaining shares, and on the importance of contractual frictions for headquarter services
and intermediate inputs. As expected, the proﬁts of the ﬁnal-good producer are higher the higher
the demand level A is, the lower the costs of inputs ch and cm are, and the less attractive the
suppliers’ outside option wm is. In addition, her proﬁts are lower the larger ωh or ωm is, which
implies that her proﬁts are higher the larger the fraction of contractible activities in headquarter
services and/or in intermediate inputs is. These results are summarized in12
Proposition 1 The proﬁts of the ﬁnal-good producer are decreasing in input costs cj, j = h,m,
declining in the outside option of suppliers, wm, and increasing in the shares of contractible activities
µj, j = h,m.
Bearing in mind that βm =1− βh,n o t et h a tp r o ﬁts are not monotonic in βh, rather they
are smallest when the revenue share of the ﬁnal-good producer equals zero or one, and proﬁts are



















ωj (1 − αωk) −
p
ωhωm (1 − αωh)(1− αωm)
ωj − ωk
for j,k = h,m, k 6= j; (10)
and it implies that (β∗
h − β∗
m)(ωh − ωm) ≥ 0, with strict inequality holding when ωh 6= ωm.T h a t
is, the ﬁnal-good producer wants to give the supplier less than half the revenue if and only if
the noncontractible activities in m are less important than the noncontractible activities in h.
Moreover, β∗
j is increasing in ωj and declining in ωk, k 6= j,a n dβ∗
h = β∗
m =1 /2 for ωh = ωm.I n
other words, the ﬁnal-good producer wants to give the supplier lower shares of the revenue the less
important noncontractible activities in m are and the more important noncontractible activities in












Figure 1: Bargaining shares and headquarter intensity




ηj, it also implies that the ﬁnal-good producer’s optimal β∗
h is increasing
in ηh, declining in µh, and increasing in µm. Finally, proﬁts are rising with βj for 0 <β j <β ∗
j and
declining with βj for β∗
j <β j < 1. These results are summarized in
Proposition 2 The optimal shares β∗
h and β∗
m have the following properties:
(i) (β∗
h − β∗
m)(ωh − ωm) ≥ 0, with strict inequality for ωh 6= ωm,a n dβ∗
h = β∗
m =1 /2 for ωh = ωm.
(ii) β∗
h is increasing in ηh, declining in µh, and increasing in µm.
(iii) Proﬁts are rising with βj for 0 <β j <β ∗
j and declining with βj for β∗
j <β j < 1, j = h,m.
We will use these results in the following analysis.
3 The Make-or-Buy Decision
We now consider the tradeoﬀ between integration and outsourcing; that is, whether to make the
intermediate input in-house or outsource it to an outside supplier. In this section we focus on the
case in which both choices are made in the same country, say the home country of the ﬁnal-good
producer. In this event input costs do not depend on the organizational form, nor do the degrees
of contractual friction.13 Moreover, the outside option of suppliers, wm, does not depend on the
make-or-buy decision. Under the circumstances we can focus on diﬀerences in the revenue shares
βj. In view of part (iii) of Proposition 2 the ﬁnal-good producer prefers organizational forms with
βh closer to β∗
h.
13One could, of course, allow µm to vary with the internalization decision, but we prefer to avoid this complication.
9Figure 1 depicts β∗
h as a function of ηh. In view of part (ii) of Proposition 2 this is an increasing
function, and it is easy to verify that β∗
h approaches 0 when ηh → 0 and β∗
h approaches 1 when
ηh → 1,a ss h o w ni nt h eﬁgure.
Now consider what determines the share βh under outsourcing and integration. In stage 7 of
the game the investment levels xh (i) and xm (i) are predetermined and therefore so are the input
levels Xh and Xm of headquarter services and components. At this stage the supplier and the
ﬁnal-good producer bargain over the distribution of revenue R that they will receive when the ﬁnal
goods are sold in the market. Under outsourcing, Xm belongs to the supplier, while Xh belongs
to the ﬁnal-good producer. If the bargaining fails, output q equals zero and so does revenue.
Moreover, given the high speciﬁcity of these inputs, which have no value outside the relationship,
the outside option of every player equals zero. We assume that the parties engage in generalized
Nash bargaining with a bargaining weight β ∈ (0,1) for the ﬁnal-good producer and 1 − β ∈ (0,1)
for the supplier. Therefore the solution to the bargaining game, which gives every player his/her
outside option plus the bargaining weight times the ex-post gains from the relationship, delivers
the ﬁnal-good producer the payoﬀ 0+β (R − 0 − 0) = βR . Namely, it gives her the fraction β
of the revenue. By similar reasoning the supplier gets (1 − β)R. It follows from this analysis that
under outsourcing the ﬁnal-good producer gets the fraction
βhO = β
of the revenue, while the supplier gets the fraction βmO =1− β.
Next consider integration. Under this arrangement the supplier is the ﬁnal-good producer’s
employee and therefore the supplier does not own the intermediate input. As a result the outside
option of the supplier equals zero. Following Grossman and Hart (1986), we assume that in the
absence of the supplier’s cooperation the ﬁnal-good producer, who owns both Xh and Xm, cannot
produce as eﬃciently with these inputs on her own as she can with the cooperation of the supplier.
In particular, we assume that the ﬁnal-good producer can produce on her own only a fraction
δ ∈ (0,1) of the output that she can produce with the cooperation of the supplier, i.e., δq instead
of q,w h e r eq is given in (2). In these circumstances the revenue is δαR instead of R,w h e r e
R = A1−αqα is the revenue generated by q (see (1)). It follows that now the outside option of
the ﬁnal-good producer is not zero but δαR, and this outside option is smaller the larger is the
eﬃciency loss from the departure of the supplier. As a result, the ﬁnal-good producer’s payoﬀ from
bargaining is δαR + β (R − δαR − 0) = βhV R,w h e r e
βhV = β +( 1− β)δα
is the share of the revenue accruing to the ﬁnal-good producer. The supplier obtains the revenue
share βmV =1−βhV .E v i d e n t l y ,βhV >β= βhO, which means that the ﬁnal-good producer gets a
larger share of the revenue under integration than under outsourcing. In what follows, our analysis
proceeds under the assumption that βhV >β hO.
10Figure 1 depicts the revenue shares βhO and βhV and the headquarter intensities ηhL and ηhH
for which each one of these shares maximizes proﬁts. Part (iii) of Proposition 2 implies that all
ﬁrms with intensity below ηhL prefer to outsource and all ﬁrms with intensity above ηhH prefer to
integrate. By continuity, ﬁrms with intensity slightly above ηhL also prefer to outsource and ﬁrms
with intensity slightly below ηhH also prefer to integrate. And we show in the Appendix that a
unique critical intensity level exists between ηhL and ηhH, denoted in the ﬁgure by ηhc,a tw h i c h
a ﬁrm is just indiﬀerent between outsourcing and integration. Firms with headquarter intensity
below ηhc outsource and those with intensity above ηhc integrate.14 This result is similar to our
result in Antràs and Helpman (2004).
In order to study the impact of the quality of legal systems on industrial structure we need to
understand how contractual frictions aﬀect the make-or-buy decision. To this end ﬁrst consider an
improvement in contracting for intermediate inputs, reﬂected in an increase in µm, the fraction of
contractible activities in the manufacturing of components. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies that
this raises the optimal revenue share βh. In Figure 1 this translates into an upward shift of the β∗
h
curve. As a result, the critical intensity levels ηhL and ηhH decline. We show in the Appendix that
the critical intensity level ηhc also declines.15 The implication is that in response to improvements
in contracting possibilities for components, more ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁrms with a larger range of headquarter
intensities, choose to integrate. The reason is that with better contracting in intermediate inputs,
ﬁnal-good producers are less dependent on the power of the incentives they can oﬀer suppliers,
and for this reason outsourcing – which gives the suppliers stronger incentives than integration –
becomes less attractive.
Importantly, the opposite happens when contracting improves in headquarter services. In this
case part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies that the optimal revenue share βh declines for every ﬁrm
and the cutoﬀ ηhc rises.16 As a result ﬁrms with a larger range of headquarter intensities choose
outsourcing over integration. The reason is that with better contracting in headquarter services it
becomes more important to give suppliers better incentives, because contractual frictions now play
a relatively more important role in components. In response more ﬁrms choose outsourcing, which
gives the suppliers more powerful incentives.
T h e s er e s u l t sa r es u m m a r i z e di nt h ef o l l o w i n g :
Proposition 3 Let ﬁxed and variable costs be the same under integration and outsourcing. Then:
(i) There exists a unique headquarter-intensity cutoﬀ ηhc ∈ (0,1) such that proﬁts are higher under
14The last statement follows from the fact that the critical value ηhc is unique, as we show in the Appendix.
Note that at this critical value proﬁts (8) are the same when the ﬁrm outsources or integrates, which means that
the value of Z is the same under both organizational forms. Let Z (βh,η h) be the value of Z when the ﬁnal good
producer receives a fraction βh of the revenue and headquarter intensity is ηh. Then the deﬁnition of β
∗
h implies that
Z (βhO,η hL) >Z(βhV ,η hL) and Z (βhO,η hH) <Z(βhV ,η hH). For this reason the continuity of the function Z (·)
implies that there exists a critical value ηhc ∈ (ηhL,η hH) such that Z (βhO,η hc)=Z (βhV ,η hc). The uniqueness of
ηhc results from the fact that the ratio Z (βhO,ηh)/Z (βhV ,η h) is declining in ηh.
15This stems from the fact that the ratio Z (βhO,η h)/Z (βhV ,η h) (deﬁned in the previous footnote), which is
declining in ηh at ηh = ηhc, also is declining in µm at ηh = ηhc.
16T h el a s tr e s u l ts t e m sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h er a t i oZ (βhO,η h)/Z (βhV ,η h), which is declining in ηh at ηh = ηhc,
is increasing in µh at ηh = ηhc.
11outsourcing for ηh <η hc and higher under integration for ηh >η hc.
(ii) The cutoﬀ ηhc is higher the larger µh is and the smaller µm is.
This proposition implies that whenever sectors diﬀer by headquarter intensity and organizational
choices do not aﬀect ﬁxed and variable costs, the make-or-buy decision does not depend on a ﬁrm’s
productivity, only on its sectoral aﬃliation. All ﬁrms in low headquarter intensity sectors choose
outsourcing and all ﬁrms in high headquarter intensity sectors choose integration. Moreover, the
fraction of sectors that choose integration is larger the larger is the fraction of contractible activities
in components and the smaller is the fraction of contractible activities in headquarter services.
We next examine the impact of ﬁxed costs on the make-or-buy decision of ﬁrms with diﬀerent
productivity levels. To this end suppose that there are diﬀerent ﬁxed costs of running an inte-
grated or an outsourcing enterprise, which we denote by FV and FO, respectively. Under these
circumstances we can replace the proﬁt function (8) with
πi = ZiΘ − wm − Fi, for i = O,V, (11)
where i represents the organizational form, and Zi is the derived parameter Z when evaluated at
βh = βhi and the industry’s ηh. At this point we take variable costs ch and cm t ob et h es a m ef o r
both organizational forms, and therefore for a given industry, Zi varies only with βhi.P r o p o s i t i o n
3 implies that ZO >Z V for ηh <η hc and ZO <Z V for ηh >η hc.
Following Antràs and Helpman (2004), we now assume that integration involves higher ﬁxed
costs than outsourcing. Two opposing forces determine these costs. On the one hand managerial
overload is larger in an integrated enterprise, because management has to pay attention to many
more tasks. On the other hand there are economies of scope in management. If the managerial
overload imposes larger costs than the costs saved due to economies of scope then FV >F O.I nt h e
opposite case FV <F O.
For concreteness we assume FV >F O. Under the circumstances proﬁts from outsourcing
are higher than proﬁts from integration in all sectors with ηh <η hc, independently of a ﬁrm’s
productivity level. The proﬁt function πO is depicted in Figure 2; it has an intercept at minus
wm + FO and a constant slope ZO. The resulting proﬁts are negative for Θ < Θ. For this reason
only ﬁrms with higher productivity manufacture in this industry. We also depict in this ﬁgure the
proﬁt function from integration, πV ;i th a sal o w e ri n t e r c e p tb e c a u s eFV >F O and a lower slope
because ZV <Z O. This shows that in industries with low headquarter intensity all proﬁtable ﬁrms
outsource.
Figure 3 depicts the two proﬁt functions πO and πV in a sector with high headquarter intensity.
Now the ﬁxed costs still give outsourcing an advantage, as they did in the low headquarter intensity
sector. But this is partly oﬀset by lower-power incentives to the supplier, which helps the ﬁnal-good
producer (i.e., ZV >Z O). As a result, outsourcing dominates integration only for low-productivity
ﬁrms, those with Θ < ΘO.17 It follows that ﬁrms with productivity below Θ do not produce, those
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Figure 3: Proﬁt function in a sector with ηh >η hc
13with productivity between Θ and ΘO outsource, and ﬁrms with productivity above ΘO integrate.
Our results on the choice of organizational forms by ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels are
summarized in
Proposition 4 Let variable costs be the same under integration and outsourcing and let ﬁxed costs
be higher under integration. Then:
(i) In every sector there exists a cutoﬀ Θ such that ﬁrms with productivity below Θ do not produce.
(ii) In a sector with ηh <η hc, all ﬁrms with productivity above Θ outsource.
(iii) In a sector with ηh >η hc, there exists a cutoﬀ ΘO such that all ﬁrms with productivity above
this cutoﬀ integrate. If this cutoﬀ is above Θ,t h e na l lﬁrms in the productivity range (Θ,ΘO)
outsource.
This proposition shows how ﬁxed-cost diﬀerences between organizational forms interact with pro-
ductivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms in shaping sectoral make-or-buy decisions. In economies with
higher ﬁxed costs of integration, high-productivity ﬁrms integrate and low-productivity ﬁrms out-
source in sectors with high headquarter intensity. In sectors with low headquarter intensity all
ﬁrms outsource.
Now consider the impact of contractual frictions on the relative prevalence of integration and
outsourcing. Evidently, this analysis applies only to sectors with ηh >η hc,i nw h i c ht h et w o
organizational forms coexist. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), we measure the prevalence of an
organizational form by the fraction of ﬁrms that adopt it.
For this purpose let the cumulative distribution function of productivity be G(Θ).T h e n i n



















It follows that the share of integrating ﬁrms is larger the larger the ratio Θ/ΘO is. From the





can be below Θ.I nt h el a t t e rc a s ea l lp r o ﬁtable ﬁrms in the industry integrate.
18There is a productivity distribution of θ,s a yGθ (·), and this distribution induces a distribution of Θ = θ
α/(1−α),
G(·).W h e n θ is distributed Pareto with the shape parameter k then Θ is also distributed Pareto with the shape





Therefore σV is larger the larger the ratio ZV /ZO is. We show in the Appendix that this ratio is
decreasing in µh and increasing in µm. As a result, the share of outsourcing ﬁrms, which equals
1 − σV ,i si n c r e a s i n gi nµh and declining in µm. We therefore have
Proposition 5 Let variable costs be the same under integration and outsourcing and let ﬁxed costs
be higher under integration. Then in sectors with ηh >η hc in which ΘO > Θ t h es h a r eo fo u t s o u r c i n g
ﬁrms is increasing in µh and declining in µm.
It follows from this proposition that larger contractual frictions in headquarter services encourage
integration and larger contractual frictions in components encourage outsourcing. For this reason
overall improvements in the quality of the legal system, which raise the fraction of contractible
activities in both headquarter services and components, may raise the relative prevalence of inte-
gration or outsourcing.19 A key insight from this proposition is that contractual improvements per
se do not bias the industrial structure toward outsourcing, because the diﬀerential impact of the
improvement on contractual frictions in the two inputs plays an important role.
Note that Proposition 5 describes the impact of variations in contractual frictions on the preva-
lence of outsourcing even when there are general equilibrium eﬀects, as long as the general equilib-
rium feedbacks do no impact the relative cost ratio (wm + FO)/(FV − FO), because the unit costs
ch and cm do not aﬀect the ZV /ZO ratio, nor does the demand level A. It is therefore evident that
this proposition holds in the general equilibrium of a one-factor economy, in which the ﬁxed costs
Fi, i = O,V,a n dwm are proportional to the price of the factor. In fact, in this case we can think
of wm as the factor price.20
4 Foreign Sourcing
Next consider foreign sourcing. We assume that the ﬁnal-good producer is located in North, which
is a high-cost country. But North has good contracting institutions so the fraction of activities
that are contractible is larger in North. Now a ﬁrm is not required to source the intermediate
19To clarify this point, let λ be an index of the quality of a country’s legal system and let µi (λ), i = O,V,b e
increasing functions of this index. Then the marginal eﬀects µ
0
i (λ), i.e., the slopes of these functions, can diﬀer
substantially. We have no theory to tell how they diﬀer, and it is clear from our analysis that there are diﬀerences
that lead to a rise in the prevalence of outsourcing and other diﬀerences that lead to a rise in the prevalence of
integration. Moreover, the shift in industrial structure may depend on sectoral characteristics, such as headquarter
intensity. We show in the Appendix an example with µi (λ)=λ for i = O,V,i nw h i c ht h er a t i oZV /ZO is rising in
λ for ηh =0 .4 and declining in λ for ηh =0 .5,w h e r eb o t ht h e s eηh’s are above ηhc.
20In our analysis we have assumed that FV >F O. Suppose instead that the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing are higher
than the ﬁxed costs of integration. In this case we obtain the following results. First, in every sector there exists a
cutoﬀ Θ such that ﬁrms with productivity below Θ do not produce. Second, in a sector with ηh >η hc, all ﬁrms with
productivity above Θ integrate. Third, in a sector with ηh <η hc there exists a cutoﬀ ΘV such that all ﬁrms with
productivity above this cutoﬀ outsource, and if ΘV >Θ,t h e na l lﬁrms in the productivity range (Θ,ΘV ) integrate.
Finally, in an industry in which some ﬁrms integrate and some ﬁrms outsource, we ﬁnd that the share of outsourcing
ﬁr m si si n c r e a s i n gi nµh and declining in µm, just as in Proposition 5. Hence, the eﬀect of contractual frictions on
the relative prevalence of integration or outsourcing is independent of the ranking of ﬁxed costs.
15input in its home country; it has a choice to source it in North or South. Unlike North, South
is a low-cost country, but its contracting institutions are weaker and therefore smaller fractions of
activities are contractible there. In what follows we denote with the superscript N variables that
are aﬃliated with North and superscript S variables that are aﬃliated with South. Our assumption
can therefore be represented by µN
j >µ S
j for j = h,m.
In addition we assume that the ﬁnal-good producer has to produce headquarter services in
North, but she can produce intermediate inputs in North or South, with cS
m <c N
m.I ne i t h e rc a s e ,
i.e., independently of whether she produces components in North or South, she has the option
to do so in-house or to outsource. When she chooses integration in South she engages in foreign
direct investment (FDI). When she chooses outsourcing in South she engages in an arm’s-length
transaction. In the former case there is intraﬁrm imports of components; in the latter case there is
arm’s-length imports of components.
T os i m p l i f yt h ea n a l y s i sw ea s s u m et h a tt h er e v e n u es h a r e sβhi, i = O,V , are the same in North
and South. As a result we can characterize the relative size of the cutoﬀ ηhc, which now depends
on whether components are produced in North or South. The cutoﬀ ηN
hc is deﬁn e di nt h es a m ew a y
as before; it represents the headquarter intensity at which the ﬁnal-good producer is indiﬀerent
between outsourcing and integration when the variable costs and ﬁxed costs are the same in both
cases, and the contractual frictions µN




V , where in computing these Zs we use equation (9) evaluated at Northern variable
costs. We have shown in the appendix that the ratio ZN
O /ZN
V does not depend on the variable costs
a n dt h a ti td e c l i n e si nηh.A sar e s u l tt h es o l u t i o nt oηN
hc is unique.
We now deﬁne analogously ηS
hc as the headquarter intensity measure at which ZS
O = ZS
V ,w h e r e
ZS
i represents the derived parameter Z in equation (9) evaluated at the unit cost of headquarter
services in North, cN
h , the unit cost of components in South, cS
m, the Southern measure of contrac-
tual friction for headquarter services, µS
h, and the Southern measure of contractual frictions for
components, µS
m.N o w t o o t h e c u t o ﬀ ηS
hc does not depend on unit costs and the ratio ZS
O/ZS
V is
declining in ηh. As a result, the cutoﬀ ηS
hc is unique. The implication is that in industries with
ηh <η S
hc we have ZS
O >Z S
V , and in industries with ηh >η S
hc we have ZS
O <Z S
V . It then follows that
among the ﬁrms who choose to oﬀshore the production of intermediate inputs, those with ηh <η S
hc
prefer to outsource, and those with ηh >η S
hc prefer to integrate, unless the ﬁxed costs of integration
and outsourcing are not the same.
Note that the ratio ZS
O/ZS
V diﬀers from ZN
O /ZN
V only as a result of the diﬀerence between µS
j and
µN
j for j = h,m. In the previous section (see Appendix for a formal proof), we have established
that ZO/ZV is decreasing in µm and increasing in µh. As a result, the lower contractibility of
components in South, µS
m <µ N
m, tends to make the ratio ZS
O/ZS
V higher than the ratio ZN
O /ZN
V .
On the other hand, our formulation implies that foreign sourcing also reduces the contractibility of
headquarter services even though these are produced in North, µS
h <µ N
h . The idea is that, as in
Antràs (2005), all parts of a contract governing an international transaction are relatively harder to
enforce. The lower contractibility of headquarter services associated with oﬀshoring tends to make
16the ratio ZS
O/ZS
V lower than the ratio ZN
O /ZN
V . Overall, whether ZS
O/ZS
V is higher or lower than
ZN
O /ZN




m. Because it seems natural
that the contractibility of an intermediate input is disproportionately aﬀected by the contracting
institutions of the country in which this input is produced, in the remainder of the paper we focus
on situations in which the diﬀerence µN
h −µS
h is low relative to the diﬀerence µN
m −µS
m.T h i sa l l o w s
us to establish the following result:
Proposition 6 When µN
h −µS
h is suﬃciently smaller than µN
m −µS
m,t h ec u t o ﬀ ηhc is higher when
components are produced in South than when they are produced in North; that is, ηS
hc >η N
hc.
This proposition implies that when weak institutions in South have a stronger eﬀect on the con-
tractibility of components than headquarter services, then more sectors ﬁnd outsourcing advanta-
geous when they oﬀshore than when they do not.21 A direct corollary of this proposition is
Corollary 1 When µN
h −µS
h is suﬃciently smaller than µN
m−µS



















V for ηh >η S
hc.
We are now ready to characterize the joint oﬀshoring and make-or-buy decisions. For this
purpose we assume, as we did in the previous section, that the ﬁxed costs of integration are higher
than the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing. Moreover, we assume that the ﬁxed costs of oﬀshoring are











In this ordering the ﬁxed costs of doing business in South are substantially higher than the ﬁxed
costs of doing business in North, and this diﬀerence overwhelms the South’s cost advantage in wm.
The resulting proﬁt functions are
π 
i = Z 
iΘ − w 
m − F 
i , i = O,V, and   = N,S. (13)
As in Antràs and Helpman (2004) it is now useful to study the equilibrium in sectors that diﬀer
by headquarter intensity, ηh.
4.1 Low Headquarter Intensity Sector
First consider an industry with headquarter intensity ηh smaller than ηN
hc. From Corollary 1 this
implies Z 
O >Z  
V for   = N,S. Given that the overall ﬁxed costs of integration w 
m + F 
V are




V is declining in ηh and µ
 
m and increasing in µ
 
h for   = N,S.
Hence, by the implicit function theorem, η
 
hc is increasing in µ
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higher than the overall ﬁxed costs of outsourcing w 
m +F 
O, it follows that in an industry with this
headquarter intensity outsourcing dominates integration in North as well as in South, independently
of a ﬁrm’s productivity level, i.e., π 
O >π  
V for   = N,S and all Θ. Under the circumstances the
eﬀective choice is between outsourcing at home and outsourcing in South. Since the ﬁxed costs of
outsourcing in South are higher than the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing in North, there is a tradeoﬀ
between these two organizational forms only if ZS
O >Z N
O ; otherwise outsourcing in South dominates
outsourcing in North. But the slope diﬀerential between the two proﬁt functions from outsourcing
is driven by two considerations. On the one hand the variable unit costs of producing components
are lower in South, i.e., cN
m >c S
m,w h i c hr a i s e sZS
O relative to ZN
O . On the other hand contractual
frictions are higher in South, i.e., µN
j >µ S
j for j = h,m, which reduces ZS
O relative to ZN
O .I n
other words, the marginal proﬁtability from higher productivity can be higher or lower in South
depending on diﬀerences in unit costs and in contractual frictions.22 In industries with ZS
O <Z N
O ,
all ﬁrms outsource in North. In industries with ZS
O >Z N
O , high-productivity ﬁrms outsource in
South.
Figure 4 depicts the tradeoﬀ for ZS
O >Z N
O . Firms with productivity below Θ lose money either
way, and they do not produce. Firms with productivity between Θ and ΘN
O outsource in North,
and those with productivity above ΘN
O outsource in South. This sorting pattern is similar to Antràs
and Helpman (2004), except that now the case ZS
O <Z N
O can also arise, in which all ﬁrms outsource
in North. Note also that in the case depicted in the ﬁgure it is possible that all ﬁrms will outsource
in South if Θ > ΘN
O; otherwise the two organizational forms coexist in the industry.
We now calculate the fraction of ﬁrms that outsource in South–that is, the fraction of ﬁrms





There the assumption was µ
 
j =0for j = h,m,a n d  = N,S.



































It follows from these equations that σS
O is larger the larger the ratio ZS
O/ZN
O is. Naturally, this ratio
is larger the larger the unit cost advantage of the South cS
m/cN
m is. Moreover, from Proposition 1,
the ratio ZS
O/ZN
O is larger the larger is the fraction of contractible activities in South, either µS
m or
µS
h, and the smaller is the fraction of contractible activities in North, either µN
m or µN
h .I ns u m m a r y ,
we have
Proposition 7 Consider an industry with ηh <η N
hc.T h e n n o ﬁrm integrates and there exists a
cutoﬀ Θ given by (14) such that ﬁrms with productivity Θ < Θ do not produce. In addition:
(i) If ZS
O <Z N
O then all ﬁrms with Θ > Θ outsource in North.
(ii) If ZS
O >Z N
O then there exists a cutoﬀ ΘN
O given by (15) such that all ﬁrms with Θ > ΘN
O
outsource in South, and if ΘN







O > Θ then the fraction of oﬀshoring ﬁrms is larger the larger are the fractions of con-
tractible activities in South and the smaller are the fractions of contractible activities in North.
A key implication of this proposition is that lower contractual frictions in South encourage oﬀ-
shoring, while lower contractual frictions in North discourage oﬀshoring.
Although our emphasis in this paper is on the roles played by contractual frictions, it is use-
ful to note that two additional sectoral characteristics also aﬀect the extent of foreign sourcing:
productivity dispersion and headquarter intensity. As to productivity dispersion, Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple (2004) show that it varies substantially across sectors. We have a natural measure of
dispersion, embodied in the shape parameter κ of the Pareto distribution; productivity dispersion






¢κ, that this share is declining in κ.T h e r e f o r e ,o ﬀshoring is more prevalent in
sectors with more productivity dispersion.
Next consider the impact of ηh on the extent of foreign sourcing. In Antràs and Helpman (2004)
we found that oﬀs h o r i n gi sl e s sp r e v a l e n ti ns e c t o r sw i t hh i g h e rh e a d q u a r t e ri n t e n s i t y .T h i si se a s i l y
generalized in the current model, in which contractual frictions vary across inputs and countries.
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Since unit variable costs of components are lower in South, it follows that this ratio is lower in sectors
that are more headquarter intensive. Moreover, since σS
O is increasing with the ratio ZS
O/ZN
O ,w e
conclude that outsourcing in South is less prevalent in sectors that are more headquarter intensive.
A novel feature of the more complex model is that this result may not hold when contractual





m =0 . That is, there are no contractual frictions in North, there are no contractual frictions in
headquarter services in South, but no activities of components are contractible in South. Moreover,
let α =0 .4, βhO =0 .2, and cN
m/cS
m =1 .1. Then the ratio ZS
O/ZN
O is declining in ηh.H o w e v e r ,




4.2 Medium Headquarter Intensity Sector






. Corollary 1 implies that in such an industry
outsourcing dominates integration in South, because ZS
O >Z S
V , but in North integration dominates
outsourcing for high-productivity ﬁrms, because ZN
V >Z N
O . Figure 5 presents the proﬁt functions
πN
O and πN
V , which describe the tradeoﬀs in the make-or-buy decision of ﬁrms who choose to
manufacture components in North; the ﬁxed costs are higher for integration while the marginal
proﬁts from higher productivity are also higher from integration. The ﬁgure shows a cutoﬀ Θ below
which ﬁrms lose money either way, and therefore they do not produce. Firms with productivity










make higher proﬁts from outsourcing, and ﬁrms with productivity above ΘN
O make
higher proﬁts from integration. Naturally, if the ﬁxed costs of integration are very low, such that
ΘN
O < Θ, then some low-productivity ﬁrms choose not to produce and all those who produce
integrate.
F i g u r e5a l s os h o w sap r o ﬁt function from outsourcing in South, πS
O.24 The ﬁxed costs of
outsourcing in South are higher than the ﬁxed costs of integration in North. As a result, integration
in North dominates outsourcing in South for all Θ whenever ZS
O ≤ ZN
V . In other words, if the impact
on proﬁtability of the less favorable contractual environment in South is large enough, relative to the
South’s unit cost advantage cS
m/cN
m, so as to yield ZS
O ≤ ZN
V ,t h e nn oﬁrm in this industry oﬀshores.
Instead the ﬁgure shows proﬁts from outsourcing in South for ZS
O >Z N
V , which means that the
South’s unit cost advantage is large relative to its disadvantage in the contractual environment.
But the ﬁgure exhibits a case in which the ratio ZS
O/ZN
V > 1 is not too large, so that the cutoﬀ, ΘN
V ,
at which proﬁts from integration in North just equal proﬁts from outsourcing in South, is larger
than ΘN











integrate in North, and those with
higher productivity levels outsource in South. Also note that if ZS
O/ZN







,t h e nn oﬁrm integrates in North. In this case a cutoﬀ exists between Θ and ΘN
O
such that ﬁrms between Θ and this cutoﬀ outsource in North and ﬁrms above this cutoﬀ outsource
in South.
We now focus on the case depicted in Figure 5, in which all three organizational forms that are






coexist, i.e., outsourcing in North, inte-
gration in North, and outsourcing in South. We wish to study the prevalence of these organizational


































O is. From Proposition 1 we
have that ZS
O is increasing in µS
j for j = h,m,w h i l eZN
i is increasing in µN
j for j = h,m, i = O,V.
In addition, the Zs corresponding to a particular sourcing location are not a function of the degree
of contractibility in the other country. We can thus conclude that oﬀshoring, which takes the
form of outsourcing in our middle headquarter intensity sector, is more prevalent the better the
contractual environment in South is and the worse the contractual environment in North is.
24Since outsourcing in South dominates integration in South, we do not show the proﬁt function from integration
in South.



















Evidently, this share does not depend on contractual frictions in South (µS
m or µS
h). As a result,


















O, varies inversely with the share of ﬁrms that outsource in South and
is thus decreasing in µS
m and µS
h.
The eﬀect of Northern contracting institutions on the shares σN
O and σN
V is more complicated.
F i r s tn o t et h a tσN
O is decreasing in the ratio ZN
V /ZN
O , which in turn is increasing in µN
m and decreas-
ing in µN
h . Hence, unlike in our low headquarter intensity sector, an improvement in contracting
institutions in North does not always lead to more ﬁrms outsourcing in North. The nature of this
contracting improvement in North is important for the direction of the eﬀect: better contractibility
in headquarter services leads to relatively more outsourcing in North, but better contractibility in
components leads to relatively less outsourcing. Finally, because both σN
O and σS
O are decreasing in
µN
m, we conclude that the share of ﬁrms integrating in North is higher the higher the contractibility
of components is in North. Interestingly, however, an improvement in the contractibility of head-
quarter services in North, which reduces foreign oﬀshoring, does not always lead to an increase in
the share of ﬁrms integrating in North.25
We can summarize our results for the intermediate-headquarter-intensity sector as follows:






.T h e nn oﬁrm integrates in South and
there exists a cutoﬀ Θ given by (14) such that ﬁrms with productivity Θ < Θ do not produce. In
addition, there exist two thresholds ΘN
V and ΘN















integrate in North, and ﬁrms with higher productivity outsource in South.
(ii) The fraction of oﬀshoring ﬁr m si sl a r g e r( w h e r eo ﬀshoring takes the form of outsourcing)
and the fraction of ﬁrms that integrate in North is smaller the larger the fractions of contractible
activities are in South. The fraction of ﬁrms that outsource in North is not aﬀected by contractual
frictions in South.
(iii) The fraction of oﬀshoring ﬁrms is smaller and the fraction of ﬁrms that source in North is larger
25The reason is that this type of contracting improvement improves the proﬁtability of integration in North relative
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Figure 6: Proﬁts from outsourcing and integration when ηh >η S
hc: four organizational forms
the larger the fractions of contractible activities are in North. A disproportionate improvement in
the contractibility of components in North may reduce however the share of ﬁrms that outsource in
North, while a disproportionate improvement in the contractibility of headquarter services in North
may reduce the share of ﬁrms that integrate in North.
As in the low headquarter intensity sector, we ﬁnd in this case too that oﬀshoring declines with
contractual frictions in South and rises with contractual frictions in North. The main diﬀerence
with the previous case is that the share of ﬁrms that outsource in North is now independent of
contractibility in South and it no longer unambiguously increases when contacting institutions
improve in North. Evidently, these diﬀerences stem from the fact that under the conditions of this
proposition, oﬀshoring competes with integration in North rather than with outsourcing in North.26
4.3 High Headquarter Intensity Sector
Propositions 7 and 8 imply that in sectors with headquarter intensity ηh <η S
hc, no foreign direct
investment takes place; there can be integration in North but not in South. It follows that oﬀshoring
via integration can emerge only in sectors with relatively high headquarter intensity. So consider
a sector with ηh >η S
hc. Corollary 1 implies that in such a sector the marginal proﬁtability of
integration is higher than the marginal proﬁtability of outsourcing in each one of the countries,
i.e., Z 
V >Z  
O for   = N,S. In this case all four organizational forms may coexist in equilibrium:
outsourcing in North, integration in North, outsourcing in South, and integration in South (FDI).





















V low enough ﬁxed costs of outsourcing in South lead to an equilibrium in which
low-productivity ﬁrms outsource in South and high-productivity ﬁrms outsource in North, with no ﬁrm integrating.
In this type of equilibrium oﬀshoring competes with outsourcing in North, just as it does in sectors with ηh <η
N
hc.
23outsource in South, and those with Θ > ΘS
O integrate in South, i.e., they engage in foreign direct
investment. Naturally, we can change the assumptions on ﬁxed costs or the ranking of the marginal
proﬁts Z
j
i to eliminate one or more of the regimes in this case too. But their ranking by productivity
will not be aﬀected.
W en e x ts t u d yt h ed e t e r m i n a n t so ft h er e l a t i v ep r e v a l e n c eo fd i ﬀerent organizational forms in
an equilibrium in which all four forms coexist. Our ﬁrst observation is that the shares of ﬁrms that
outsource in North or integrate in North are given as before by (18) and (20), respectively. (Recall
that these expressions were derived for intermediate headquarter intensity sectors.) Because the
thresholds ΘN
V and ΘN
O are also deﬁned as before, by (17) and (19), respectively, we conclude that
the eﬀects of changes in contractibility on the shares σN
O and σN







,a ss u m m a r i z e di nP r o p o s i t i o n8 .
It remains to discuss how the degree of contractibility of diﬀerent inputs in diﬀerent countries
aﬀects the relative prevalence of ﬁrms that outsource in South or engage in FDI there. A direct










is larger the larger contractibility is in South, and is lower the larger contractibility is in North.
How is the decrease in the share of ﬁrms that oﬀshore distributed between ﬁrms that outsource



















.( 2 3 )
It thus follows that the share σS







O is. Evidently, the
share of ﬁr m st h a td oF D If a l l sa sar e s u l to fi n c r e a s e si nµN
j for j = N,S. Moreover, the fraction


























. We can thus con-
clude that an improvement of contractibility in North increases the prevalence of FDI relative to
foreign outsourcing. Given that the share of ﬁrms engaged in FDI is negatively aﬀected by such
an improvement in contractibility in North, we also conclude that the share of ﬁrms that out-
source falls. In sum, larger contractibility in North is associated with lower shares of both types of
oﬀshoring ﬁrms, with the decrease falling disproportionately on ﬁrms that outsource.
We noted above that an improvement in contracting institutions in South increases the share of
24ﬁrms that oﬀshore. We next want to study the eﬀects of this change on the relative prevalence of
the two distinct types of oﬀshoring: outsourcing and FDI. In doing so, it is important to distinguish
between improvements in the contractibility of components and improvements in the contractibility
of headquarter services.
Consider the former ﬁrst. Remember that the share of ﬁrms that do FDI, σS




















. W eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e d
a b o v et h a tb o t hZS
O and the ratio ZS
V /ZS
O are increasing in µS
m.A sar e s u l t ,t h es h a r eo fﬁrms that
do FDI is increasing in the contractibility of components in South.
The eﬀect of µS
m on σS















A larger contractibility of components in South makes foreign outsourcing relatively more proﬁtable
than integration in North (Θ/ΘN
V falls), but it also decreases the proﬁtability of outsourcing in
South relative to FDI (Θ/ΘS
O falls). The balance of these two eﬀects is in general ambiguous,
and we cannot rule out that increases in µS
m actually reduce the share of ﬁrms that outsource in
South. Moreover, although the above discussion might have suggested that an improvement in
the contractibility of components in South has a disproportionately large eﬀect on FDI relative to





We ﬁnally study the eﬀects of an improvement in the contractibility of headquarter services in
South on the share of ﬁrms that outsource in South and the share of ﬁrms that engage in FDI. As
































,s h o w st h a t
it is decreasing in µS
h. As a result, we conclude that an improvement in the contractibility of head-
quarter services in South increases the share of ﬁrms oﬀshoring there, with a disproportionately
positive eﬀect on the share of ﬁrms that outsource in South. As a matter of fact, the dispropor-
tionate eﬀect may be large enough to generate a negative relationship between µS
h and the share of
ﬁrms that engage in FDI.
The results we obtained for the high-headquarter-intensity sector can be summarized as follows
Proposition 9 Consider an industry with ηh >η S
hc. Then there exists a cutoﬀ Θ given by (14)




O,d e ﬁned by (17), (19) and (23), such that if ΘN
V > ΘN
O > Θ then:

















outsource in South, and ﬁrms with higher

























m =0 .5 and µ
S
















is lower when µ
S
m =0 .7 than when µ
S
m =0 .5.H e n c e ,a ni n c r e a s ei nµ
S
m can reduce the fraction of oﬀshoring ﬁrms
that engage in FDI.
25productivity integrate in South.
(ii) The fraction of oﬀshoring ﬁrms is larger and the fraction of ﬁrms that integrate in North is
smaller the larger are the fractions of contractible activities in South. The fraction of ﬁrms that
outsource in North is not aﬀected by contractual frictions in South. A disproportionate improvement
in the contractibility of components in South may reduce the share of ﬁrms that outsource in South,
while a disproportionate improvement in the contractibility of headquarter services in South may
reduce the share of ﬁrms that integrate in South.
(iii) The fractions of oﬀshoring ﬁrms, both oﬀshore outsourcing ﬁrms and ﬁrms engaged in FDI,
are smaller and the share of ﬁrms that source in North is larger the larger are the fractions of
contractible activities in North. A disproportionate improvement in the contractibility of components
in North may, however, reduce the share of ﬁrms that outsource in North, while a disproportionate
improvement in the contractibility of headquarter services in North may reduce the share of ﬁrms
that integrate in North. Moreover, the fraction of outsourcers among the set of oﬀshoring ﬁrms is
larger the smaller the fractions of contractible activities µN
h and µN
m in North are.
An important implication of this proposition is that a better contractual environment in South
or a worse contractual environment in North do not equally encourage oﬀshore outsourcing and
FDI; they tend to encourage oﬀshore outsourcing relatively more, except in cases in which the
contractual improvement in South aﬀects disproportionately the production of components.
5 Concluding Comments
In this paper we have generalized the global sourcing model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) to
accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In the model, a continuum of ﬁrms with
heterogenous productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource intermediate inputs and in
which countries to source the inputs. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationship-
speciﬁc investments which are only partially contractible, both in an integrated ﬁr ma n di na n
arm’s-length relationship. The degree of contractibility can vary across countries and inputs.
Our model generates equilibria in which ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels chose diﬀerent
ownership structures and supplier locations. Assuming a Pareto distribution of productivity, we
studied the eﬀects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the relative prevalence
of these organizational forms. We have shown that an improvement in contractual institutions in
South raises the prevalence of oﬀshoring, but it can reduce the relative prevalence of either FDI
or oﬀshore outsourcing if it aﬀects disproportionately the contractibility of headquarter services
or components, respectively. This result embodies one of the major messages of the paper: the
relative prevalence of alternative organizational forms depends not only on cross-country diﬀerences
in contractibility, but also on the degree to which contractual institutions are biased toward inputs
controlled by the ﬁnal-good producer or other suppliers.
Although our model is partial equilibrium in scope, it can be embodied in a general equilibrium
framework. Such an analysis might shed light on the sources of international income diﬀerences and
26their relationship to the structure of contractual frictions and the resulting trade and investment.
Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006) provide a ﬁrst step in this direction by analyzing the impact
of contractual frictions on technology choice and the resulting productivity levels, but their model
does not feature trade in intermediate inputs nor foreign direct investment. For this reason it cannot
address the issues discussed in this paper. It is necessary to integrate the choice of technology with
the choice of organizational form in order to obtain a uniﬁed theory which is suitable for the study
of links between the quality of contractual institutions, productivity, and trade and investment.
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A.1 Derivation of the Proﬁt Function (8) and Proof of Lemma 1






π ≡ R − ch
Z 1
0
xh (i)di − cm
Z 1
0
xm (i)di − wm,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (4) and the revenue and output equations (1) and


































































This representation of the revenue is obtained by substituting (4) into (2) and the result into (1).
The ﬁrst-order conditions (6) follow directly from this problem.
To prove Lemma 1, note from (3) and (6) that xjc >x jn i fa n do n l yi f
1 − α
P
 =h,m β ω 
1 − αω
>β j.
But, since β  ∈ (0,1) for   = h,m, the left-hand side is larger than 1 while the right-hand side is
smaller than 1,i m p l y i n gxjc >x jn.


















1−αω , for j = h,m.
The solution to this system of equations yields (7).














x  (i)di − wm.
Substituting (6) into this expression yields
π =( 1− α)
µ1 − α
P




Using (A2) together with (7) yields (8).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, ﬁrst note from (8) that proﬁts are trivially a decreasing function of input
costs and the outside option of suppliers. To show that proﬁts are decreasing in ωj, j = h,m,














is decreasing in ωj. Taking logarithms of both sides and diﬀerentiating, we obtain
∂ lnπω
∂ωh
= αlnβh − αln
µ1 − α
P




α[1 − αβmωm − βh (1 − αωm)]
1 − α
P

















1 − βmαωm − βh (1 − αωm) ≥ 1 − αωm − βh (1 − αωm)






















α2 (1 − βm)[1− βmαωm − βh (1 − αωm)]
(1 − αβmωm)





<g(0) = αlnβh + α(1 − βh) < 0.
The last inequality results from the fact that lnβh +1−βh is maximized at βh =1 ,i nw h i c hc a s e
g(0)|βh=1 =0 .Y e tβh ∈ (0,1), and therefore we have the inequality.
We have thus proved that proﬁts are declining in ωh, and therefore they are rising in µh (because
ωh =( 1− µh)ηh). Symmetric arguments show that proﬁts are also declining in ωm and therefore
increasing in µm.
Note ﬁnally that the only channel through which the parameters ωh and ωm aﬀect proﬁts is
through the function Z in (9). Hence, it is also the case that Z is increasing in µh and µm.
A.3 Characterization of β
∗
j and Proof of Proposition 2
In order to characterize β∗













and computing the partial derivative with respect to βj yields an expression which is proportional
to the polynomial
(ωj − ωk)β2
j − 2ωj (1 − αωk)βj + ωj (1 − αωk).





ωj (1 − αωk)
£p
ωj (1 − αωk) −
p
ωk (1 − αωj)
¤
ωj − ωk
for j,k = h,m, k 6= j,
and that for k 6= j,
p
ωj (1 − αωk) >
p
ωk (1 − αωj) i fa n do n l yi fωj >ω k. Under the circum-
stances β∗
j > 0 for j = h,m, and since β∗
h + β∗
m =1 , it also implies β∗
j < 1. Second note that the
second root of the quadratic equation from which β∗
j has been solved is
β∗
j =
ωj (1 − αωk)+
p
ωhωm (1 − αωh)(1− αωm)
ωj − ωk
for j,k = h,m, k 6= j,
and this root is larger than 1,b e c a u s eωj (1 − αωk) > (ωj − ωk). It follows that proﬁts are rising
with βj for 0 <β j <β ∗
j and declining with βj for β∗
j <β j < 1.
To prove Proposition 2 ﬁrst note that L’Hôpital’s rule implies β∗
j → 1/2 when ωj → ωk for
k 6= j. Second,
(β∗
h − β∗
m)(ωh − ωm)=ωh (1 − αωm)+ωm (1 − αωh) − 2
p
ωhωm (1 − αωh)(1− αωm)
=
hp
ωh (1 − αωm) −
p
ωm (1 − αωh)
i2
≥ 0, (A3)
with strict inequality holding when ωh 6= ωm, because in this case
p
ωh (1 − αωm) 6=
p
ωm (1 − αωh).
32Moreover, hp
ωh (1 − αωm) −
p
ωm (1 − αωh)
i
(ωh − ωm) > 0 for ωh 6= ωm.












ωm (1 − αωm)
ωh (1 − αωh)
.
The previous arguments then establish that the right-hand side is strictly positive. It follows that
β∗
h is strictly increasing in ωh. A symmetric argument implies that β∗
m is strictly increasing in ωm.
Therefore β∗
h is strictly declining in ωm.
A.4 Determinants of the Make-or-Buy Decision and Proof of Proposition 3














 =h,m β V ω 
1 − α
P
 =h,m β Oω 
!(1−αω)/(1−α)
.
















+(1− α(ωh + ωm))ln
µ
1 − α(βhV ωh +( 1− βhV )ωm)
1 − α(βhOωh +( 1− βhO)ωm)
¶
.( 2 5 )
We will ﬁrst prove that ln(ZV /ZO) is an increasing function of ωh and a decreasing function of
ωm. This will immediately imply that ZV /ZO is increasing in ηh and µm and decreasing in ηm and
µh.











1 − α(βhV ωh +( 1− βhV )ωm)
1 − α(βhOωh +( 1− βhO)ωm)
¶
+
(1 − αωh)α(1 − α(ωh + ωm))(βhV − βhO)
(1 − α(βhOωh +( 1− βhO)ωm))(1 − α(βhV ωh +( 1− βhV )ωm))
.
To show that ∂ ln(ZV /ZO)/∂ωm < 0 w ew i l lp r o c e e di nt w os t e p s . W ew i l lﬁrst show that
∂2 ln(ZV /ZO)/∂ω2
m < 0 and then that, when evaluated at ω =0 , ∂ ln(ZV /ZO)/∂ωm is nega-
tive.






(1 − αωh)(βhV − βhO)α2
(1 − α(βhOωh +( 1− βhO)ωm))




g (α,βhV ,βhO,ωh,ωm)=βhV + βhO +2 αωh − βhV αωm − 2βhV αωh − αβhOωm − 2αβhOωh
+2βhV αβhOωm − 2βhV αβhOωh − 2α2ωmωh +3 βhV α2ωmωh
+3α2βhOωmωh − 4βhV α2βhOωmωh − βhV α2 (ωh)




The function g (·) is somewhat complex, but we can show that it only takes positive values in the
relevant domain. To see this note that
∂g(·)
∂ωm
= −α(βhV (1 − αωh)(1− βhO)+βhO (1 − βhV )(1− αωh)+2 αωh (1 − βhO)(1− βhV )) < 0,
and thus it suﬃces to check that g(α,βhV ,βhO,ωh,1) is positive. But this follows from
g (α,βhV ,βhO,ωh,1) = (1 − α)(βhV − βhO +2 βhO (1 − αωh)+2 αωh (1 − βhV ))
+(2βhV βhO (1 − αωh)+βhV αωh (1 − βhO)+ωhβhOα(1 − βhV ))α(1 − ωh),
which indeed is a sum of positive terms.
Step 2: Next we note that, when evaluated at ωm =0 ,w eh a v et h a t∂ ln(ZV /ZO)/∂ωm < 0













2 (βhV − βhO)




α(1 − αωh)(αωh (1 − βhO)+βhO (1 − αωh))
(1 − βhO)(1− αβhOωh)
2 > 0,
and thus βhV =a r g s u p h(βhO) (remember that βhO ≥ βhV is not possible). Finally, note that
h(βhV )=0 , and thus it follows that h(βhO) < 0 and ∂ ln(ZV /ZO)/∂ωm < 0 for all ωm ∈ (0,1).
This completes the proof that ZV /ZO is an decreasing function of ωm.
The proof of ∂ ln(ZV /ZO)/∂ωh > 0 is analogous, though we need not repeat all the steps. It













1 − ˆ βhO
1 − ˆ βhV
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1 − ˆ βhO
´




1 − ˆ βhV
´




where ˆ βhO > ˆ βhV . Notice that this expression is analogous to the one we used to prove that
∂ ln(ZV /ZO)/∂ωm < 0, but with negative signs throughout. We can thus conclude that ZV /ZO is
increasing in ωh.
Given these results we can conclude that ZV /ZO is increasing in ηh and µm and decreasing in
ηm. Next, we want to show that outsourcing is preferred to integration for a low enough ηh,w h i l e














1 − (1 − βhV )αωm
1 − (1 − βhO)αωm
¶
.
Because βhV >β hO, using the fact that (1 − ax)xa/(1−a) is an increasing function of x for a ∈ (0,1)





1 − (1 − βhV )αωm
1 − (1 − βhO)αωm
¶
< 1.
This implies that ZV /ZO < 1and thus proﬁts are higher under outsourcing in such a case (remem-
ber that ﬁxed and variable costs are here assumed identical under integration and outsourcing).

















Again, using the fact that (1 − ax)xa/(1−a) is an increasing function of x for a ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1),
we can conclude that ln(ZV /ZO) > 0 and proﬁts are higher under integration in such a case.
Given the monotonicity of ln(ZV /ZO) and the two extreme cases ηh → 0 and ηh → 1,w ec a n
thus conclude that a unique headquarter- intensity cutoﬀ ηhc ∈ (0,1) exists, such that proﬁts are
higher under outsourcing for ηh <η hc and higher under integration for ηh >η hc.
T op r o v ep a r t( i i )o fP r o p o s i t i o n3i ts u ﬃces to use the implicit function theorem. The cutoﬀ
ηhc is implicitly deﬁned by ZV /ZO =1 .S i n c e ZV /ZO is increasing in ηh, decreasing in µh,a n d
increasing in µm, we can conclude that the cutoﬀ ηhc is higher the larger µh is and the smaller µm
is.
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 =h,m β V ω 
1 − α
P
 =h,m β Oω 
!(1−αω)/(1−α)
.
Let α =4 /5, βhV =1 /2, βhO =1 /3, and µh = µm = λ =1 /4. Then we have that, when ηh =0 .4,
we obtain ZV /ZO =1 .027,w h i l ew h e nηh =0 .5,w eh a v eZV /ZO =1 .193.I fw er a i s eλ to 1/2,w e
instead obtain ZV /ZO =1 .03 when ηh =0 .4,and ZV /ZO =1 .125 when ηh =0 .5. Hence, the eﬀect
of λ (and thus overall contractibility) on the ratio ZV /ZO is ambiguous.
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